Musing about Political Reform in China (Part 2)

Not all one party systems are the same. The most significant difference between the PRC's one party system and the other countries' one party system is the fact that there are always two parellel organizations running side by side between the state and the party. Like all the Communist countries such as Vietnam and North Korea, the state organization is always the junior member.

This is a scenario where the party is above the state and the party discpline is above the law. Take for example, Chen Liangyu was first brought to face the party discpline before being sent to face the court of law. In another word, it is the supremacy of the party rules that prevails in PRC and not the rule of laws. Another example is PLA remains firstly the CCP's militia, albeit a very big one, and then the PRC's armed force. All these go to explain the supremacy of the party over the state.

The big question with all the one party system is its ability to hold itself accountable with its internal check and balance mechanism. What is conspicuously absent in the CCP and PRC is the lack of the rule of laws, an independent anti-corruption commission and administrative ombudsmen, a free and critical media as well as a robust administrative legal system. Supposed, all the above are in place, Chen Liangyu's sexual exploit, illegal land dealing would have been uncovered and he would have been unseated from power much earlier. The very lack of these mechanism means there is at present day a very lagged deterent system which encourage trangresses.

Another big question is the opagueness in leadership selection. Without some form of overt intra-party electoral process, how can the people be confident that the leader chosen in the smoke-filled room is one who is committed and competent? One party system often fails to produce good leaders and the country's fate is left to chance. It may not be fair to say whether autocratic power or a democratic power is more successful. The very essence of democarcy is the choice the people have, without which, Thaksin-inspired party would not have returned to power and Thailand would remain under the Junta's rule. The same is true with Philippines, without democracy, Immelda Marcos will perhaps in power now succeeding her husband. It is not often a country is so lucky to have LKY or Deng and the successive CCP leaders who didn't rock the boat.

The very substantial economic and political progress made by CCP's rule is remarkable and well appreciated. The mandate that CCP enjoys are based, in the first 30 years since the liberation, on revolution and the next 30 years based on the progress made after the Deng's reform. What is the basis of CCP's mandate for the next 30 years? This will be a big question come next year when PRC reaches 60. The circle of 60 years is important to the Chinese culture.

While there are many things are left to be desirable under CCP, we can nevertheless give the benefit of the doubt to the CCP that the political system in China would take a different course and it would have the special Chinese characteristic. Let's also accept that China need not copy the Western notion of separation of power and the plural democracy. The question is thus for CCP to explain what kind of political system CCP envisaged for China to make a China truly a peoples' republic. I believe the true answer is - CCP doesn't have an answer now. They are still searching for the answer but the the search and the introspection has to start now.

What is going to happen, it will be depend on the development in several fronts. as I have argued elsewhere, it will be very interesting to watch the political development in HK for the next 20 years because whatever happens in HK politically is definiely what is approved or tolerated by the central government (read CCP) and that in turn will provide a glimpse into what a political system CCP is prepared to accept in the future. Toleration of political dissent is a unique quality and HK over the last 11 years has shown remarkable accommodation. This maybe due in part to CCP's common front strategy to win over the critics. Nevertheless it augur well. It is to be hoped that CCP shows greater toleration when dealing with domestic dissents. For example, putting the human right activist or reporters behind the bar without clear evidence of national security breaches doesn't win friends and goodwill. This go back to the rule of laws.

No question, CCP will also watch very closely other Chinese polity including Singapore and Taiwan. Singapore's one party system in PAP is a tempting role model. PAP, in my view, relies upon the constitutional framework to perpetuate the one party system whereas CCP does not. Further, PAP doesn't have a vibrant intra-democracy and this certainly suite CCP's taste. PAP's leaders are often selected and groomed by consensus and do not emerge via overt intra-party contest. In this aspect, CCP and PAP are very much alike but this cannot be regarded as a constructive lesson. The positive lesson from Singapore is definitely the adoption of her constitutional framework that would require CCP to separate the party organization from the state structure. Making the state and the constitution supreme will be the goal.

Unlike HK and Singapore, who are both British clones, ROC had developed a blue blood Chinese polity with a plural form of democracy. What I am sure is that the ROC's experience both in mainland and in Taiwan in the past 100 years is not something that the CCP admires. Plural democracy is detested. What CCP admire is a system of government where the ruling party will continue in power and deliver an able and competent administration which enjoy the peoples mandate.

On the question on the impact of common market on the subject of reunification, I hold a sceptical view. Europe has more than 50 years of common market experience, yet, the political union for Europe is still a long way from materializing. I am not confident that the cross strait common market will be a catalyst for the reunification. As I argued elsewhere that it will require CCP to initiate fundamental constitutional reform in the mainland before any substantive prospect of unification can be entertained. This would ideally be accomplished through a constitutional convention to engage all political constituents, whether domestic or in exile, whether maindland or Taiwan, to redefine what a modern constitutional China should be and could be. The timing is again after 2020s.

Incidentally, I was watching the TV yesterday, I was pleasantly surprised to see the extent of CCTV coverage on the newly formed Executive Yuan in Taiwan. There is no question that the mainlanders are getting more and more information even though somewhat political correct regarding the political system and culture in Taiwan even before the 3 links materializes. It is very difficult to discern what are the CCP's objectives in giving so much media coverage to Taiwan's political system. Is it meant to draw a positive or negative lesson from plural democracy? is it a conscious plan to prepare the peoples for plural democracy? On the second question, I am not prepared to think so.

With the younger generation of mainlanders becoming more educated on the choice of political system, it will over times - between 2020s-2030s - released a bottom-up new political culture made effective ad efficient by the seemless internet power. At the same time CCP would usher in a new generation of political leaders who are receptive and confident. The domestic front would be such that these two developments respectively bottom-up and top down will coincide and unleast the political renaissance that the chinese in the past 150 years have been striving for would have come to fruition.