Musing about Political Reform in China (Part 1)

(This is a reply by KH in response to Democracy in China only after 2022)


The evolution of single party states in Asia ....CCP, LDP, KMT, PAP, BN, Golkar, Congress etc... is a subject worthy of a lot of discussion - and probably a great many Ph.D thesis. Your thesis on internal party elections in CCP got me thinking about the 'lens' though which we look at political reform...and whether a multi-party democracy is the only desired end-state?

Ruling (single) parties in much of Asia including the CCP were invariably (at one time) the party of progress and modernisation. These parties tend to have a national as opposed to a party-political agenda. One tend to forget that often, at some distant past, they replaced something even more backward and distasteful (the exception being Burma). Often, they represent the national consensus, although one which may be outdated. Thats why their opponents tend to be seen as working against the "nation". The presence of a strong national consensus (often that is to be independent, modern and rich) is actually a source of great strength for many Asian nations. Which is also why it is difficult to transform into the single party state to a 2/multi party system.

However, political reform is an ongoing reality. To (mis?)quote, a well-known historianonce said that the study of human history taught him that only 2 things to be true. First, change when they occur happens slower than expected. Second, change when they occur happens faster than expected. Anywhere in Asia, driven by the larger trends of modernization and globalization of the economy, knowledge and (more gradually) of shared universal values, politics is changing. The only question is how much of it is taking place below the surface. On final analysis, bottoms-up change is more concrete than flashy news stories of dissidents, elections or anti-government protests. Due our Taoist heritage, we have a less difficult time understanding that when there is nothing there is something and when there is something there is noting (!). Westerners who sees everything in emperical terms - yes or no, black or white. Media and pundits simply look silly to read too much into events, read too little into the big picture and be impatient with history. Between the appearance and the substance of political reform lies most of the misunderstanding between Western and non-Western analysis of political reform in Asia.

Many observers also tend to (over)simplify things by saying that China is pursuing economic liberalization but not political liberalization. I would argue that is a false choice because one is also the other, two sides of the same coin, different means to the same ends. I support your assertion that consicously or not the Chinese leadership "already possessed some kind of road map towards the democratization process". Indeed, political reform is part of "reform and opening up"; just that in China changes happen when no one is looking. Compare today with 1978, it couldnt be further from the truth to argue that China had not democratised simply because it is still under CCP rule.

No, I believe the purpose of political reform is to creation of a stable modern political culture. In my view, the usual indicators such as free and fair elections, opposition parties, a free and critical press or other forms of overt political contests actually gives a false result on the health of the political reform because it stresses the process more than the conditions. It is like judging a marriage by the quality of the wedding. By discerning between appearance and substance, political reform is more about developing the pillars underpinnings of a stable modern political culture than elections. I would pay more attention to the development (often below the surface) of the following 5 pillars:

(1) rule of law - fundamentally important for independent institutions, ultimately a check on abuse of power by individuals and maintain credibility of the 'system';
(2) credible administrative system (incl. law enforcement) - even the best intentions is useless if incompetent. The rule of law must be seen to be enforced. More democracy are undermined by weak governments than by dictators;
(3) strong private sector - there must be enough wealth in private hands to counter the power of the state. the people should be able to vote with ballots, wallet and their feet;
(4) broad-based education - for rational and informed discussions and debate.
(5) respect for the private individual - including respect for private life, property, thoughts etc. far from only dealing with civil and political rights, many societies also need to deal with social justice: race, class, social mobility, meritocracy etc.

You can make great progress political reform without multi-party elections, but I'd argue also that rushing to the appearance of a multi-party democracy without investing reform in the preconditions will end up with a dysfunctional system. Interestingly, an autocratic power can probably be more successful in developing those 5 pillars.

Examples of political reform from an autocracy to multi-party democracy; the most successful Asian transitions to democracy took place in post-war Japan and in Korea and Taiwan in the 90s. Yes, there were timely acts of leadership in all those places but I'd argue that political reform that created those pillars for democracy were present all along. I'd say that the process is far advanced in Hong Kong and highly present in Singapore and Malaysia.

Political reform (defined as a modern liberal democracy) is arguably less advanced in Indonesia, Thailand or the Philipines even though they already have a multi-party system. The reality in Asia is that there are few if any examples of a genuine two-party system - Taiwan and India being nascent examples. The reality is often: intra-party factionalism like the LDP, India Congress party or personality-based political parties like we see in Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India amongst the regional parties. Mostly, these personal-patronage political system is another word for legal and systemic corruption. Here the people pay the costs of democracy without getting the fruits of democracy; voters do not usually even get a real difference whichever way they vote. To me this is not a healthy democracy. If Philippines is so democratic why would people need to topple the elected government twice in the last 20 years? Same argument for Thailand although its the military that does the toppling.

The irony is not lost on that single-party states like Singapore, LDP-Japan, KMT-era Taiwan, Korea under military rule can often actually deliver better economic freedom and even civil and political rights than a corrupt democracy. I'd argue that ultimately it is because their 5 pillars are better developed. So I would argue that the priority for CCP should be to develop, as much as possible, the 5 pillars a modern political system described above.

One can point out that the examples given are all wealthy places. Am I saying that the rich are better than poor countries at political modernisation? Is it because a growing and wealthy middle-class will cause political change? My answer is no with respect to causation. Political reform and economic growth both relies on the same 5 pillars I cited above. One does not cause the other because both were growing together. We may see the plant but we forget the roots were growing as well. In my view, over the last 30 years China has made arguably the greatest progress towards a modern political system since the fall of the Qing dynasty. Today the typical person (especially in the cities) enjoy more economic freedom, personal freedom and even civil and political space than almost anytime in history. This is to be appreciated.

You are right in citing elections in Hong Kong as a major catalyst. It is a great confidence building exercise for the CCP in experimenting with pluralism - although HK is far more developed in the 5 pillars. Taiwan is a great influence because a lot of people are following it in the mainland; and they can see first-hand the strengths and weaknesses. I believe that a de-facto common market across the straits is at hand in 5 -10 years. With mainlanders travelling to Taiwan, a population 3x bigger than HK and even closer linguistic and cultural background, Taiwanese in mainland will inadvertantly be a political catalyst too.

Like you, I too believe the tipping point will be around 2020-30 but I base it on demographics. By 2020, easily more than half the population will be born after 1978 and after 2030, very few will be old enough to actually experienced the Cultural Revolution - so as an optimistic generation grows up the fear for political change grow less that means more personal liberties at least at the grassroot level. On current trends for the first time in history every Chinese would have had schooling. I hope the CCP will maintain a strong and effective state but I also hope the CCP will push hard for social justice and ensure equal opportunities even for the poor minority farm boy/girl. As the economy grows more advanced, it can reasonably be expected to have a more robust rule of law. As you pointed out, by 2020-30 the leaders - western educated or not - would have spent their entire life working and dealing with the outside world. I like your analysis of the 6th generation leadership of the CCP. Although they may be more incremental rather than transformational in brining about major political changes, I believe that political reform ongoing at the fundamental level, political changes will occur very naturally, without upheaval but equally transformational.