[24/3 - Partly revised.]
I just came back from my daughter's class field trip to the New York Historical Society where they viewed an exhibition of Abraham Lincoln. That exhibition has been going on for a year since it opened on Mr Lincoln's 200th birthday and examines his Presidency's relationship to New York City.
I did not finish seeing the exhibit and for sure I cannot be mistaken for a scholar of Lincoln. But the exhibition made an impression on me because it reminded me that greatness is a difficult and arduous journey that feels anything but great when traveling on it.
What I learn from the exhibit is that Lincoln was given a political boost and became a political star due to the promotion of certain New York political barons of the (then nascent and comparatively social-progressive) Republican Party who wanted their own non-establishment candidate to challenge the establishment favorite William Seward. They wanted a Westerner candidate for the presidential election of 1860 to propel them out of their narrow political base; some one who would speak credibly about expansion to the West (free land, free labor, free men), lavish protection on industry (tariffs, railways, ports and canals etc.), anti-unions and be mildly anti-slavery. Lincoln proceeded to gave a famous and widely promoted speech at the Cooper Union in New York setting out his vision; which on slavery was actually a compromise whereby the South can keep their slaves but new territories would henceforth be free of slaves. He was not an abolitionist but was only against the expansion of slavery.
Aided by his powerful patrons, Lincoln soon gathered the support of many political forces that were against the Democratic Party: populists (who are anti-business), abolitionists (who are anti-slavery) but also neo-Fascist movements such as the "Wide Awakes" and the Nativist/xenophobic "Know Nothing Party".
The big businesses in New York favored the Democratic Party which was the establishment party; and businesses are wary of the abolitionist movement because they fear any rupture (or worse, war) with the south would mean disruption of business, loss of access to raw material supplies to the mills in the North and markets in the South.
Lincoln won the Presidency with only 40% of the popular votes. But wary of Lincoln's views on slavery, 7 Southern states seceded from the Union even before he took office. His popularity fell even further especially in the major cities of the Northeast.
But when Fort Sumner was attacked, patriotic fervor caused the North to rally around him; but within a year and many battlefield defeats (and war supplies corruption and mounting government indebtedness) later Lincoln found himself deeply unpopular. The newspapers and public opinion were deeply scathing. To raise money for the war effort, Lincoln instituted the income tax and a federal backed US dollar amidst widespread opposition. He strong-armed and wrestled many powers such as the raising and provisioning of armies from the States and into Federal control. His opponents were decrying the end of the United States and against him for trampling on the Constitution. There was huge outcry that he was resorting to dictatorial means. To put down dissent, he imposed martial law allowing detention by military tribunals without trial, which incarcerated 10-15000 people! Amidst all these, he suffered huge electoral losses during elections which resulted in openly antagonistic state governments /governors who were out to thwart him at every turn.
In a bid to recalibrate the reasons for fighting, which initially was about the preservation of the Union, and to get more Union recruits Abraham Lincoln issued the initial Emancipation Proclamation as a military order in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. It was quite limited in scope at first being limited only to the Confederated States (but preserves slavery in some border states such as Delaware and Maryland) and primarily serve to pressurize the South. Later, it was extended to all lands seized by the Union army hence making abolition a Union war objective. He was also hoping to encourage slave revolts and gather freed slaves into the Union Army.
Granted, there were pragmatic reasons and risks if he were not more gradualist in abolishing slavery. Lincoln was concerned that outright abolition might tilt Northern slave states into joining the Confederacy. Maryland in particular was a concern because it was the crucial link between Washington DC and the North. Lincoln's abolitionist stand became more and more resolute after the Emancipation Proclaimation and in the end, became a non-negotiable term for ending the war.
As a military order, it did not have the force of law that an Act of congress would have. Belatedly, as the tide turned in the Civil War, Lincoln got Congress to entrench it as the XIII amendment to the Constitution, which was not ratified until after Lincoln's death when it was ratified by 2/3 of the states. Mississippi did not ratify that amendment until 1995.
If judged by popularity alone, it would be hard to make any assessment of Lincoln's greatness during his lifetime. For most of 1864 prior to his re-election, he did not think he was going to be re-elected. In fact, only when the tide of war turned in September 1864, two months before the election, before his victory became possible. Nonetheless, despite having only the Northern states participating in the election he was re-elected in 1864 with a respectable but far from heroic 54% of the vote. He would likely have lost the election had the Southern states participated. Especially in the South and amongst those opposed to the ascendancy of Federal government vis-a-vis the rights of the states Lincoln remained a much hated figure even after his death.
It an interesting and telling perspective on how a person is being judged by one's contemporaries as opposed to posterity.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
"We are not bound to win, but we are bound to be true"
Last Saturday, President Obama gave Democrat congressmen a pep talk prior to eventually passing health care reform which happened late last night, in a historic and landmark achievement. It takes spending a few years in the US (and a few years living outside) to realise how ridiculously dysfunctional the US health system is. It spends 2x more per capita than other developed countries and yet leave 15% of its population to fend on their own uninsured; and as much more under-insured meaning they go broke if they fall sick. Meanwhile the costs are so out of control that it saps the competitiveness of US economy, cause real wages to be stagnant since the 1990s and costs the Federal Government 33% of its budget (rising to 50% at current rate in 2020).
There will be many things to be said for the President, but I came across this excerpt from the off-the cuff talk he gave last Saturday, which I feel has value in posterity for anyone in politics or in public service. When I first read it, I breathe hard and read it again. I thought of all the people in politics and in public life. And it convinced me that in the President we have a good man who deserve support and success.
(approximately 22 mins into a 30 mins pep talk - or 2 mins into this clip: http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/03/20/without-a-teleprompter/#more-23761
".......I know what it's like to take a tough vote. But what did Lincoln say? “I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true.” Two generations ago, folks who were sitting in your position, they made a decision -- we are going to make sure that seniors and the poor have health care coverage that they can count on. And they did the right thing.
And I'm sure at the time they were making that vote, they weren't sure how the politics were either, any more than the people who made the decision to make sure that Social Security was in place knew how the politics would play out, or folks who passed the civil rights acts knew how the politics were going to play out. They were not bound to win, but they were bound to be true.
And now we've got middle class Americans, don't have Medicare, don't have Medicaid, watching the employer-based system fray along the edges or being caught in terrible situations. And the question is, are we going to be true to them?
Sometimes I think about how I got involved in politics. I didn't think of myself as a potential politician when I get out of college. I went to work in neighborhoods, working with Catholic churches in poor neighborhoods in Chicago, trying to figure out how people could get a little bit of help. And I was skeptical about politics and politicians, just like a lot of Americans are skeptical about politics and politicians are right now. Because my working assumption was when push comes to shove, all too often folks in elected office, they're looking for themselves and not looking out for the folks who put them there; that there are too many compromises; that the special interests have too much power; they just got too much clout; there's too much big money washing around.
And I decided finally to get involved because I realized if I wasn't willing to step up and be true to the things I believe in, then the system wouldn't change. Every single one of you had that same kind of moment at the beginning of your careers. Maybe it was just listening to stories in your neighborhood about what was happening to people who'd been laid off of work. Maybe it was your own family experience, somebody got sick and didn't have health care and you said something should change.
Something inspired you to get involved, and something inspired you to be a Democrat instead of running as a Republican. Because somewhere deep in your heart you said to yourself, I believe in an America in which we don't just look out for ourselves, that we don't just tell people you're on your own, that we are proud of our individualism, we are proud of our liberty, but we also have a sense of neighborliness and a sense of community -- (applause) -- and we are willing to look out for one another and help people who are vulnerable and help people who are down on their luck and give them a pathway to success and give them a ladder into the middle class. That's why you decided to run. (Applause.)
And now a lot of us have been here a while and everybody here has taken their lumps and their bruises. And it turns out people have had to make compromises, and you've been away from families for a long time and you've missed special events for your kids sometimes. And maybe there have been times where you asked yourself, why did I ever get involved in politics in the first place? And maybe things can't change after all. And when you do something courageous, it turns out sometimes you may be attacked. And sometimes the very people you thought you were trying to help may be angry at you and shout at you. And you say to yourself, maybe that thing that I started with has been lost.
But you know what? Every once in a while, every once in a while a moment comes where you have a chance to vindicate all those best hopes that you had about yourself, about this country, where you have a chance to make good on those promises that you made in all those town meetings and all those constituency breakfasts and all that traveling through the district, all those people who you looked in the eye and you said, you know what, you're right, the system is not working for you and I'm going to make it a little bit better.
And this is one of those moments. This is one of those times where you can honestly say to yourself, doggone it, this is exactly why I came here. This is why I got into politics. This is why I got into public service. This is why I've made those sacrifices. Because I believe so deeply in this country and I believe so deeply in this democracy and I'm willing to stand up even when it's hard, even when it's tough.
Every single one of you have made that promise not just to your constituents but to yourself. And this is the time to make true on that promise. We are not bound to win, but we are bound to be true. We are not bound to succeed, but we are bound to let whatever light we have shine. We have been debating health care for decades. It has now been debated for a year. It is in your hands. It is time to pass health care reform for America, and I am confident that you are going to do it tomorrow. Thank you very much, House of Representatives. Let's get this done. (Applause.) "
There will be many things to be said for the President, but I came across this excerpt from the off-the cuff talk he gave last Saturday, which I feel has value in posterity for anyone in politics or in public service. When I first read it, I breathe hard and read it again. I thought of all the people in politics and in public life. And it convinced me that in the President we have a good man who deserve support and success.
(approximately 22 mins into a 30 mins pep talk - or 2 mins into this clip: http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/03/20/without-a-teleprompter/#more-23761
".......I know what it's like to take a tough vote. But what did Lincoln say? “I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true.” Two generations ago, folks who were sitting in your position, they made a decision -- we are going to make sure that seniors and the poor have health care coverage that they can count on. And they did the right thing.
And I'm sure at the time they were making that vote, they weren't sure how the politics were either, any more than the people who made the decision to make sure that Social Security was in place knew how the politics would play out, or folks who passed the civil rights acts knew how the politics were going to play out. They were not bound to win, but they were bound to be true.
And now we've got middle class Americans, don't have Medicare, don't have Medicaid, watching the employer-based system fray along the edges or being caught in terrible situations. And the question is, are we going to be true to them?
Sometimes I think about how I got involved in politics. I didn't think of myself as a potential politician when I get out of college. I went to work in neighborhoods, working with Catholic churches in poor neighborhoods in Chicago, trying to figure out how people could get a little bit of help. And I was skeptical about politics and politicians, just like a lot of Americans are skeptical about politics and politicians are right now. Because my working assumption was when push comes to shove, all too often folks in elected office, they're looking for themselves and not looking out for the folks who put them there; that there are too many compromises; that the special interests have too much power; they just got too much clout; there's too much big money washing around.
And I decided finally to get involved because I realized if I wasn't willing to step up and be true to the things I believe in, then the system wouldn't change. Every single one of you had that same kind of moment at the beginning of your careers. Maybe it was just listening to stories in your neighborhood about what was happening to people who'd been laid off of work. Maybe it was your own family experience, somebody got sick and didn't have health care and you said something should change.
Something inspired you to get involved, and something inspired you to be a Democrat instead of running as a Republican. Because somewhere deep in your heart you said to yourself, I believe in an America in which we don't just look out for ourselves, that we don't just tell people you're on your own, that we are proud of our individualism, we are proud of our liberty, but we also have a sense of neighborliness and a sense of community -- (applause) -- and we are willing to look out for one another and help people who are vulnerable and help people who are down on their luck and give them a pathway to success and give them a ladder into the middle class. That's why you decided to run. (Applause.)
And now a lot of us have been here a while and everybody here has taken their lumps and their bruises. And it turns out people have had to make compromises, and you've been away from families for a long time and you've missed special events for your kids sometimes. And maybe there have been times where you asked yourself, why did I ever get involved in politics in the first place? And maybe things can't change after all. And when you do something courageous, it turns out sometimes you may be attacked. And sometimes the very people you thought you were trying to help may be angry at you and shout at you. And you say to yourself, maybe that thing that I started with has been lost.
But you know what? Every once in a while, every once in a while a moment comes where you have a chance to vindicate all those best hopes that you had about yourself, about this country, where you have a chance to make good on those promises that you made in all those town meetings and all those constituency breakfasts and all that traveling through the district, all those people who you looked in the eye and you said, you know what, you're right, the system is not working for you and I'm going to make it a little bit better.
And this is one of those moments. This is one of those times where you can honestly say to yourself, doggone it, this is exactly why I came here. This is why I got into politics. This is why I got into public service. This is why I've made those sacrifices. Because I believe so deeply in this country and I believe so deeply in this democracy and I'm willing to stand up even when it's hard, even when it's tough.
Every single one of you have made that promise not just to your constituents but to yourself. And this is the time to make true on that promise. We are not bound to win, but we are bound to be true. We are not bound to succeed, but we are bound to let whatever light we have shine. We have been debating health care for decades. It has now been debated for a year. It is in your hands. It is time to pass health care reform for America, and I am confident that you are going to do it tomorrow. Thank you very much, House of Representatives. Let's get this done. (Applause.) "
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Power Influence in Southeast Asia - Comments from Anonymous
Anonymous said...
The question is always relative power vs absolute power. I think in terms of absolute power US influence is unquestionable. They have their navies, their internet, their Americana of American Idol, Glee & Lady Gaga. Heck even Yao Ming and Jackie Chan know where the center of the world lies.
Yet there is no doubt that the gap is getting closer and relatively it looks like China is on the move. It doesn't help that we tend to look at these things thru the stars & stripes tinted glasses of CNN, NBC etc and despite their protestations media neutrality, cultural bias is something that will always be difficult to remove.
Yet while US definitely has a head start, China has a natural advantage. Tell me an East Asian/South East Asian country that has not been touched by Chinese culture throughout its history and I'd probably tell you East Timor and Papua New Guinea doesn't really count. China is good at coddling South East Asian countries because it is an Asian country and it instinctively understands how Asians like doing things.
Not to say China does not have disputes with its neighbors. Japan, Vietnam & India come immediately to mind. However, China's rise coincides with Asia's rise, and are inseparable.On the other hand, one could argue that increasing Chinese influence in South East Asia merely reflects a return to normal status of the last 1500 years. Colonization & Pax Americana are a blip in history and it not a matter of If but When that South East Asia returns to the motherland.
Or as Deng Xiaoping has been know to say... "its too early to tell"...
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
-------------------------------------
KH says:
Thanks for your comment "anonymous"! I applaud - and readily concede - your two excellent points on China's natural geograohical advantage and by taking the historical perspective.
My initial posting was a snapshot arguing that reports of the demise of America's influence in Southeast Asia is greatly exagerated. It does not pre-suppose that the same would be same for the future. Indeed, my closing argument was that unless we have some form of emperical measurement it would be difficult to discern the changes taking place.
In fact, when we look from the structural or historical perspective, China has an enormous built-in advantage. In terms of geographical location, there is no way Southeast Asia can ignore China. Evan at its weakest during the late Ching and early Republican era, China managed to profoundly shape Southeast Asia through migration. America can, if it chooses to, disappear from the region, but China? Never. China's proximity is an enormous source of power and influence. But one can also say that is a constant and that is supported by history. If anything, advances in technology can only strengthen China's position.
Another aspect which I neglected to elaborate on is the role of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Unlike first generation Chinese migrants, the question of identity for their ethnic Chinese population is now unambiguously localised. However, their cultural heritage and linguistic links makes it easy to "germinate" strong social-civic-intellectual connection with China.
My hypothesis is premised on the orientation amongst the country's elite. It may be no accident that the business elites (many of whom ethic Chinese) are more strongly drawn to China or more specifically to the economic opportunity in China's resurgence. But other than Singapore, Southeast Asia's political or military elite are rarely of Chinese ethnicity and hence less attuned to China. Nonetheless, as we saw with Hong Kong and Macau, when a society decides to reorientate itself to a different bearing things can change very quickly.
Which bring me to the question of what are the common interests for America to sustain its power and influence in Southeast Asia? And I could see none that is compelling. As powerful and influential as the US may be in Southeast Asia, America's power and influence has largely been by choice and not inevitable as in the case of China. With the end of the Cold War, America finds it difficult to justify the political and military investment that is needed to remain a power in the region. For years, the US also saw itself as the vanguard and defender of the global economic system of (open and capitalist) trade and commerce. However, that system is also becoming less American/Western centric as Southeast Asia, India, China and Brazil etc becomes bigger players in the global economic and commercial system.
The question is always relative power vs absolute power. I think in terms of absolute power US influence is unquestionable. They have their navies, their internet, their Americana of American Idol, Glee & Lady Gaga. Heck even Yao Ming and Jackie Chan know where the center of the world lies.
Yet there is no doubt that the gap is getting closer and relatively it looks like China is on the move. It doesn't help that we tend to look at these things thru the stars & stripes tinted glasses of CNN, NBC etc and despite their protestations media neutrality, cultural bias is something that will always be difficult to remove.
Yet while US definitely has a head start, China has a natural advantage. Tell me an East Asian/South East Asian country that has not been touched by Chinese culture throughout its history and I'd probably tell you East Timor and Papua New Guinea doesn't really count. China is good at coddling South East Asian countries because it is an Asian country and it instinctively understands how Asians like doing things.
Not to say China does not have disputes with its neighbors. Japan, Vietnam & India come immediately to mind. However, China's rise coincides with Asia's rise, and are inseparable.On the other hand, one could argue that increasing Chinese influence in South East Asia merely reflects a return to normal status of the last 1500 years. Colonization & Pax Americana are a blip in history and it not a matter of If but When that South East Asia returns to the motherland.
Or as Deng Xiaoping has been know to say... "its too early to tell"...
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
-------------------------------------
KH says:
Thanks for your comment "anonymous"! I applaud - and readily concede - your two excellent points on China's natural geograohical advantage and by taking the historical perspective.
My initial posting was a snapshot arguing that reports of the demise of America's influence in Southeast Asia is greatly exagerated. It does not pre-suppose that the same would be same for the future. Indeed, my closing argument was that unless we have some form of emperical measurement it would be difficult to discern the changes taking place.
In fact, when we look from the structural or historical perspective, China has an enormous built-in advantage. In terms of geographical location, there is no way Southeast Asia can ignore China. Evan at its weakest during the late Ching and early Republican era, China managed to profoundly shape Southeast Asia through migration. America can, if it chooses to, disappear from the region, but China? Never. China's proximity is an enormous source of power and influence. But one can also say that is a constant and that is supported by history. If anything, advances in technology can only strengthen China's position.
Another aspect which I neglected to elaborate on is the role of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Unlike first generation Chinese migrants, the question of identity for their ethnic Chinese population is now unambiguously localised. However, their cultural heritage and linguistic links makes it easy to "germinate" strong social-civic-intellectual connection with China.
My hypothesis is premised on the orientation amongst the country's elite. It may be no accident that the business elites (many of whom ethic Chinese) are more strongly drawn to China or more specifically to the economic opportunity in China's resurgence. But other than Singapore, Southeast Asia's political or military elite are rarely of Chinese ethnicity and hence less attuned to China. Nonetheless, as we saw with Hong Kong and Macau, when a society decides to reorientate itself to a different bearing things can change very quickly.
Which bring me to the question of what are the common interests for America to sustain its power and influence in Southeast Asia? And I could see none that is compelling. As powerful and influential as the US may be in Southeast Asia, America's power and influence has largely been by choice and not inevitable as in the case of China. With the end of the Cold War, America finds it difficult to justify the political and military investment that is needed to remain a power in the region. For years, the US also saw itself as the vanguard and defender of the global economic system of (open and capitalist) trade and commerce. However, that system is also becoming less American/Western centric as Southeast Asia, India, China and Brazil etc becomes bigger players in the global economic and commercial system.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Power Influence in Southeast Asia - China on the Rise and America on the Wane?
Let me shake off my long stupor of not posting since February by elaborating on a discussion I had with my cousin-nephew who is presently studying international relations (plus Chinese and Arabic languages) at Georgetown University in Washington DC.
My contention is a contrarian argument to the prevailing view that China is on the rise and America is on the wane in Southeast Asia. This argument often confuses China's enormous trade links, free-trade agreements and high-level political exchanges with Southeast Asia for power and influence. My argument is that the view is impressionistic and is not entirely supported by a rigorous and sober examination of many other key matrices for power and influence. My hypothesis is that while America power and influence is no longer dominant in Southeast Asia, it is still probably the strongest power in a region where China's power and influence has expanded enormously.
My model for understanding power and influence rests on examining 4 different facets of power and influence, and in each case focus on aspects that are largely measurable as opposed to a lesser reliance on subjective considerations such as "soft power".
My 4 facets - and they are not intended to be equally important at all times - are: economic, political, strategic/military and social-civic links.
China has enormous heft as Southeast Asia's largest (and fast-growing) trading partner, well-spring of funding, bilateral and regional economic cooperation and growing institutionalised relationships (FTAs etc.).
But economic links are not limited to trade. At the very least we should also look at investments (both inwards and outwards), monetary policy and commercial links. In Southeast Asia, the amount of cumulative investments by USA, Japan and Europe remains enormous, and in most countries far dwarfs China's nascent investments. Japan has been Southeast Asia's largest investor for many decades and those Japanese companies remain major employers and exporters in many Southeast Asian countries. How easily people forget but they are a hidden giant that should not be overlooked. So size of investment is one key measure.
As far as commercial links, precisely because so many US and European MNCs have operated so long in Southeast Asia they have become "invisible". People forget that AIA, Citibank, Facebook, Visa card, P&G (Pampers, Pantene, Duracell, Gilette etc.), Colgate Palmolive, Esso, Yahoo!, FedEx, Boeing are American companies; while Shell, HSBC, BP, Prudential, Nestle are European. Of course, the lines are often blurred because such is globalization that Nike may be American but the product is often made in China by a Korean invested firm financed by the Japanese. But all else being equal, China still has some distance to go in terms of commercial influence. After all, what is the largest Chinese company operating in Southeast Asia?
All those are in the realms of influence, but none more than monetary policy. There are many Southeast Asian currencies that are either pegged or linked to the US Dollar and for that reason their central banks keep large portions of their hard currency reserves in US Dollar. The power to influence so many Southeast Asian currency gives the US Federal Reserves significant leverage over the monetary policies in Southeast Asia - such as interest rates - that the People's Bank of China will not have until the RMB becomes a full fledged international reserve currency. Even as China becomes an enormous trading power with Southeast Asia, the terms of trade are still mostly done on US Dollar terms. These are all important measures on the economic power and influence.
Another important measure is foreign reserves/foreign investments, which for Southeast Asian countries are still mainly held in American or European assets. And the same can be said for holdings of Southeast Asian debt, which if in foreign hands are still predominantly held by Western institutions and funds; although given the growth of China's investment funds this could soon change. This is a source of influence (verging on power) that is easily overlooked but in times of crisis, holders of debt provides enormous leverage over the governments of the day (e.g., currently in Greece, but seen recently with Dubai, Iceland, Estonia, or Latin American countries from time to time). In times of conflict and international sanctions, there have been precedence of foreign assets being seized e.g. Iran, Iraq (after invasion of Kuwait), North Korea and Yugoslavia (sanctions).
Moving on to political links. For Southeast Asian countries China presents a seemingly simple political equation: unquestionable support for China's policies on Taiwan/Tibet/Xinjiang etc., no overt critisism of China , and in return China will grant a lot of personal respect, not pose any awkward questions on one's own political legitimacy or messing about with the opposition party, etc. And then, everyone can get down to business of economic growth. that is easy to like. America has tended to present a less diffident, more self-interested and incoherent relationship even as the host nation feels ignored.
At the senior leadership level, China pays a lot of attention with frequent exchange of visits with regional heads of states and government. Likewise there are extensive links at the ministerial and official level as befitting a major (even dominant?) regional political power. China plays a deft hand in this very Asian form of influence. The level of attention simply far outdistanced anything America (which has a more global spread of interests) can possibly muster in the region.
On the otherhand, if we look at what has been invested in terms of long term institutional presence in the region a more balanced picture emerges. America maintains large multifaceted (with political, economic, military, consulate, cultural (tourism, education etc.), public diplomacy functions) embassies in most Southeast Asian countries often they are the largest embassy in town. Often the US maintains consular offices outside the capital as well. China maintains comparatively large but by comparison a more modest presence that in many cases are behind those of the UK, France and even Germany. Granted, the person-to-person relationship is perhaps the most important measure for most Southeast Asian cultures; but it is important to remember there are other measures of political ties.
And not least, there is developmental aid as a measure of power and influence, although I often question the effectiveness of aid as a form of political leverage. In some countries there are still US-aid projects, but the scale is unlike during the height of the Cold War. I recall there is a US funded FELDA development near Seremban called "LBJ" after the US President Johnson! Likewise, aid from Japan which boomed in the 80s and 90s but are now a thing of the past. On the otherhand, official aid from China especially on infrastructure is expanding. This is definately also a source of growing Chinese political influence.
On the military/stretegic level, the starkest measure is obviously military presence by either China or the US in Southeast Asia. America clearly has a historic head-start: even with the closure of US bases in the Philippines it now has (official) access to bases in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, in addition to military advisors/liaison in other locations especially on counter-terrorism. That is before one considers the US Navy Seventh Fleet based in Japan and Guam which is present in the South China Sea at any one time.
China on the otherhand claim a policy against the stationing of any foreign military forces, hence precluding the stationing of the PLA outside Chinese territory - outside of UN peacekeeping or naval expeditions.
The US also has long term military alliances or mutual defence treaties with Philippines and Thailand (both are regarded as Major Non-NATO Ally) and use of military bases in Singapore. On another note, Singapore and Malaysia are part of the FPDA (Five Forces Defence Arrangement) which allows for Australia, New Zealand and the UK to come to be defence of Malaysia and Singapore. Brunei also has its own defence arrangements with the UK, British bases and military personnel. China's closest military partners in Southeast Asia are probably Cambodia and Myanmar.
In my view, another key measurement is the choice of supplies of armaments. When it comes to making significant long term investments (both in money and reliance on continuing training and technical support), Southeast Asian countries are still predominantly choose to be armed with US or European weapon systems. The US which supplied the backbone of the airforces of Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia (apart from its Russian made the MIG-29s), France also has a strong position as an alternative supplier of choice especially for naval vessels and helicopters.
Taken together the above reality are very clear and unequivocal measures of US (and British) hard power in Southeast Asia.
Overall, regional sensitivities over China's role, historic enemities (such as with Vietnam), common borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam - and lingering disputes such as over the Spartly Islands - is probably the biggest weakness in China's strategic influence in Southeast Asia. It is arguable if any Southeast Asian countries will tolerate very much Chinese military influence or presence, if ever, at all!
And the final facet is the social-civil aspect. A lot of this are sometimes characterised as "soft-power". I prefer to see this from the narrower prism of intellectual orientation of the ruling elite. Put simply, while everything from as mundane as baseball and hollywood movies or Korean soap operas - to ideas and ideals like capitalism, democracy and the rule of law - all exerts a pull on the public imagination; a more profound and immediate influence could be found in whatever that form the intellectual grounding of a country's governing elite and policy makers.
For decades, the elites of Taiwanese and Philippines are educated in the US and they bring about a distinctly American intellectual influence and extend America's influence into those countries via those personal networks. The same is true for the Singaporean and Malaysian elites and policy makers and their British influence. The modernisation of the Indonesian economy in the 1960s and 70s was led by what was called the "Berkeley mafia" of US trained economists. German-educated former President Habibie sought to orientate Indonesia to German technical experts.
Hence, for me an important indicator of China or America's influence is the where were Southeast Asia's leaders and elite educated? And almost as importantly: where do they send their children to be educated? Because that shows who they really admire. Right now, not many are sending their children for higher education in China. More esoterically, one can even look to where do Southeast Asian leaders and their family go for a holiday or buy private property as an indicator? That actually makes a difference when one considers that the leaders of Myanmar and Cambodia used to holiday or go for medical treatment in China a lot. Not any more one may assume?
More directly, another measure could be to look at the source of the society's intellectual input = its "mindshare". What is going into the minds of the country's leaders and policy makers? Where do they buy their books? And where are the authors of those books they are reading from? Who are the experts they get advise from? Countries look to those they wish to emulate for advise: economic and policy experts used to come from the old colonial masters, then in the 50s and 60s some got (ill)advisers from the Soviet Union or China, while others turn to American experts (including from NGOs like Ford Foundation or Rockerfeller Foundation). The strategic importance of the export of advisers is such that even Taiwan used to export agricultural experts as a diplomatic tool. And more recently there was a time when experts from Japanese were popular. It may not be as obvious now, but if Southeast Asian countries are hiring Arup for city planning, Goldman Sachs to advise on privatization or McKinsey to develop an economic strategy or even the World Bank/IMF, it simply reflects the reality of the continuing influence of the West, especially America in shaping Southeast Asia's thinking on the level fo government policy.
Even on the casual level, the media and news channel that currently dominate the mindshare of the educated middle class in Southeast Asia tend to be cable/satellite television and the internet that mainly of a Western (or American) origin. Rubbish or not, that is a measure of influence on the default world view and intellectual orientation of Southeast Asia. In this regard, take the example of the BBC which allows the UK to punch above its weight and Japan which has little influence relative to its importance in the region. It has been remarked that China is a world-to-itself in cyberspace and in its media (not only due to censorship but because of language and size that made it self-contained) but it has still little mindshare outside of Greater China. And even if language ceases to be a barrier, it has a steep hill to climb when competing for mindshare with the open uncensored media that Southeast Asia long has access.
In conclusion, I would like to submit that there is much more to America's power and influence in Southeast Asia than meets the eye. And plainly because we have taken them for granted we forget how pervasive and powerful America still is. China is the shiny new thing that seized our attention because its power and influence have been growing so quickly and so overtly that many have mistaken rate of change for size. I hope for a more emperical study that compare their power and influence both in real terms and in relative terms; for power and influence is not a zero sum game between the two powers: both could be growing or both could be waning because we should not forget that as the nations of Southeast Asia grows they also become less susceptable to being influenced and are regional powers in their own right.
My contention is a contrarian argument to the prevailing view that China is on the rise and America is on the wane in Southeast Asia. This argument often confuses China's enormous trade links, free-trade agreements and high-level political exchanges with Southeast Asia for power and influence. My argument is that the view is impressionistic and is not entirely supported by a rigorous and sober examination of many other key matrices for power and influence. My hypothesis is that while America power and influence is no longer dominant in Southeast Asia, it is still probably the strongest power in a region where China's power and influence has expanded enormously.
My model for understanding power and influence rests on examining 4 different facets of power and influence, and in each case focus on aspects that are largely measurable as opposed to a lesser reliance on subjective considerations such as "soft power".
My 4 facets - and they are not intended to be equally important at all times - are: economic, political, strategic/military and social-civic links.
China has enormous heft as Southeast Asia's largest (and fast-growing) trading partner, well-spring of funding, bilateral and regional economic cooperation and growing institutionalised relationships (FTAs etc.).
But economic links are not limited to trade. At the very least we should also look at investments (both inwards and outwards), monetary policy and commercial links. In Southeast Asia, the amount of cumulative investments by USA, Japan and Europe remains enormous, and in most countries far dwarfs China's nascent investments. Japan has been Southeast Asia's largest investor for many decades and those Japanese companies remain major employers and exporters in many Southeast Asian countries. How easily people forget but they are a hidden giant that should not be overlooked. So size of investment is one key measure.
As far as commercial links, precisely because so many US and European MNCs have operated so long in Southeast Asia they have become "invisible". People forget that AIA, Citibank, Facebook, Visa card, P&G (Pampers, Pantene, Duracell, Gilette etc.), Colgate Palmolive, Esso, Yahoo!, FedEx, Boeing are American companies; while Shell, HSBC, BP, Prudential, Nestle are European. Of course, the lines are often blurred because such is globalization that Nike may be American but the product is often made in China by a Korean invested firm financed by the Japanese. But all else being equal, China still has some distance to go in terms of commercial influence. After all, what is the largest Chinese company operating in Southeast Asia?
All those are in the realms of influence, but none more than monetary policy. There are many Southeast Asian currencies that are either pegged or linked to the US Dollar and for that reason their central banks keep large portions of their hard currency reserves in US Dollar. The power to influence so many Southeast Asian currency gives the US Federal Reserves significant leverage over the monetary policies in Southeast Asia - such as interest rates - that the People's Bank of China will not have until the RMB becomes a full fledged international reserve currency. Even as China becomes an enormous trading power with Southeast Asia, the terms of trade are still mostly done on US Dollar terms. These are all important measures on the economic power and influence.
Another important measure is foreign reserves/foreign investments, which for Southeast Asian countries are still mainly held in American or European assets. And the same can be said for holdings of Southeast Asian debt, which if in foreign hands are still predominantly held by Western institutions and funds; although given the growth of China's investment funds this could soon change. This is a source of influence (verging on power) that is easily overlooked but in times of crisis, holders of debt provides enormous leverage over the governments of the day (e.g., currently in Greece, but seen recently with Dubai, Iceland, Estonia, or Latin American countries from time to time). In times of conflict and international sanctions, there have been precedence of foreign assets being seized e.g. Iran, Iraq (after invasion of Kuwait), North Korea and Yugoslavia (sanctions).
Moving on to political links. For Southeast Asian countries China presents a seemingly simple political equation: unquestionable support for China's policies on Taiwan/Tibet/Xinjiang etc., no overt critisism of China , and in return China will grant a lot of personal respect, not pose any awkward questions on one's own political legitimacy or messing about with the opposition party, etc. And then, everyone can get down to business of economic growth. that is easy to like. America has tended to present a less diffident, more self-interested and incoherent relationship even as the host nation feels ignored.
At the senior leadership level, China pays a lot of attention with frequent exchange of visits with regional heads of states and government. Likewise there are extensive links at the ministerial and official level as befitting a major (even dominant?) regional political power. China plays a deft hand in this very Asian form of influence. The level of attention simply far outdistanced anything America (which has a more global spread of interests) can possibly muster in the region.
On the otherhand, if we look at what has been invested in terms of long term institutional presence in the region a more balanced picture emerges. America maintains large multifaceted (with political, economic, military, consulate, cultural (tourism, education etc.), public diplomacy functions) embassies in most Southeast Asian countries often they are the largest embassy in town. Often the US maintains consular offices outside the capital as well. China maintains comparatively large but by comparison a more modest presence that in many cases are behind those of the UK, France and even Germany. Granted, the person-to-person relationship is perhaps the most important measure for most Southeast Asian cultures; but it is important to remember there are other measures of political ties.
And not least, there is developmental aid as a measure of power and influence, although I often question the effectiveness of aid as a form of political leverage. In some countries there are still US-aid projects, but the scale is unlike during the height of the Cold War. I recall there is a US funded FELDA development near Seremban called "LBJ" after the US President Johnson! Likewise, aid from Japan which boomed in the 80s and 90s but are now a thing of the past. On the otherhand, official aid from China especially on infrastructure is expanding. This is definately also a source of growing Chinese political influence.
On the military/stretegic level, the starkest measure is obviously military presence by either China or the US in Southeast Asia. America clearly has a historic head-start: even with the closure of US bases in the Philippines it now has (official) access to bases in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, in addition to military advisors/liaison in other locations especially on counter-terrorism. That is before one considers the US Navy Seventh Fleet based in Japan and Guam which is present in the South China Sea at any one time.
China on the otherhand claim a policy against the stationing of any foreign military forces, hence precluding the stationing of the PLA outside Chinese territory - outside of UN peacekeeping or naval expeditions.
The US also has long term military alliances or mutual defence treaties with Philippines and Thailand (both are regarded as Major Non-NATO Ally) and use of military bases in Singapore. On another note, Singapore and Malaysia are part of the FPDA (Five Forces Defence Arrangement) which allows for Australia, New Zealand and the UK to come to be defence of Malaysia and Singapore. Brunei also has its own defence arrangements with the UK, British bases and military personnel. China's closest military partners in Southeast Asia are probably Cambodia and Myanmar.
In my view, another key measurement is the choice of supplies of armaments. When it comes to making significant long term investments (both in money and reliance on continuing training and technical support), Southeast Asian countries are still predominantly choose to be armed with US or European weapon systems. The US which supplied the backbone of the airforces of Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia (apart from its Russian made the MIG-29s), France also has a strong position as an alternative supplier of choice especially for naval vessels and helicopters.
Taken together the above reality are very clear and unequivocal measures of US (and British) hard power in Southeast Asia.
Overall, regional sensitivities over China's role, historic enemities (such as with Vietnam), common borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam - and lingering disputes such as over the Spartly Islands - is probably the biggest weakness in China's strategic influence in Southeast Asia. It is arguable if any Southeast Asian countries will tolerate very much Chinese military influence or presence, if ever, at all!
And the final facet is the social-civil aspect. A lot of this are sometimes characterised as "soft-power". I prefer to see this from the narrower prism of intellectual orientation of the ruling elite. Put simply, while everything from as mundane as baseball and hollywood movies or Korean soap operas - to ideas and ideals like capitalism, democracy and the rule of law - all exerts a pull on the public imagination; a more profound and immediate influence could be found in whatever that form the intellectual grounding of a country's governing elite and policy makers.
For decades, the elites of Taiwanese and Philippines are educated in the US and they bring about a distinctly American intellectual influence and extend America's influence into those countries via those personal networks. The same is true for the Singaporean and Malaysian elites and policy makers and their British influence. The modernisation of the Indonesian economy in the 1960s and 70s was led by what was called the "Berkeley mafia" of US trained economists. German-educated former President Habibie sought to orientate Indonesia to German technical experts.
Hence, for me an important indicator of China or America's influence is the where were Southeast Asia's leaders and elite educated? And almost as importantly: where do they send their children to be educated? Because that shows who they really admire. Right now, not many are sending their children for higher education in China. More esoterically, one can even look to where do Southeast Asian leaders and their family go for a holiday or buy private property as an indicator? That actually makes a difference when one considers that the leaders of Myanmar and Cambodia used to holiday or go for medical treatment in China a lot. Not any more one may assume?
More directly, another measure could be to look at the source of the society's intellectual input = its "mindshare". What is going into the minds of the country's leaders and policy makers? Where do they buy their books? And where are the authors of those books they are reading from? Who are the experts they get advise from? Countries look to those they wish to emulate for advise: economic and policy experts used to come from the old colonial masters, then in the 50s and 60s some got (ill)advisers from the Soviet Union or China, while others turn to American experts (including from NGOs like Ford Foundation or Rockerfeller Foundation). The strategic importance of the export of advisers is such that even Taiwan used to export agricultural experts as a diplomatic tool. And more recently there was a time when experts from Japanese were popular. It may not be as obvious now, but if Southeast Asian countries are hiring Arup for city planning, Goldman Sachs to advise on privatization or McKinsey to develop an economic strategy or even the World Bank/IMF, it simply reflects the reality of the continuing influence of the West, especially America in shaping Southeast Asia's thinking on the level fo government policy.
Even on the casual level, the media and news channel that currently dominate the mindshare of the educated middle class in Southeast Asia tend to be cable/satellite television and the internet that mainly of a Western (or American) origin. Rubbish or not, that is a measure of influence on the default world view and intellectual orientation of Southeast Asia. In this regard, take the example of the BBC which allows the UK to punch above its weight and Japan which has little influence relative to its importance in the region. It has been remarked that China is a world-to-itself in cyberspace and in its media (not only due to censorship but because of language and size that made it self-contained) but it has still little mindshare outside of Greater China. And even if language ceases to be a barrier, it has a steep hill to climb when competing for mindshare with the open uncensored media that Southeast Asia long has access.
In conclusion, I would like to submit that there is much more to America's power and influence in Southeast Asia than meets the eye. And plainly because we have taken them for granted we forget how pervasive and powerful America still is. China is the shiny new thing that seized our attention because its power and influence have been growing so quickly and so overtly that many have mistaken rate of change for size. I hope for a more emperical study that compare their power and influence both in real terms and in relative terms; for power and influence is not a zero sum game between the two powers: both could be growing or both could be waning because we should not forget that as the nations of Southeast Asia grows they also become less susceptable to being influenced and are regional powers in their own right.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
The Price to Pay for the Great Firewall of China
If there was any doubt before, now I have no doubt this blog is barred in China. I hope that one day very soon that the China and the CCP will realise it is strong enough not to fear words. And that include our's!
It may be that China has reasons to fear that the Chinese people - the masses - will act (or overeact) irrationally to information and the opinions of others. May be they lack the faculties of critical thinking, rational thinking, wisdom, tolerance and self-belief to respond in the most positive manner. That is also one of my concerns as China becomes a global power of historic proportions. By consciously feeding the population one carefully calibrated set of world view; one that is conducive to the ideal reality of the CCP, the CCP simply ensure that the danger persists and that can only increase.
Where most observers would see this through a power political lens, I happen to also see this as a cultural condition. One only has to look at many Chinese families to see a similar pattern of pride mixed with bitterness, success mixed with insecurity, respect mixed with resentment, love mixed with deception. Picture a scenario we see all so often: a family with showy and ambitious parents on-the-make. The parents push the kids hard, demand obedience but never listen or understand who the children really are or respect what they want from their lives. The parents lavish material goods and boasts of only good things but never admits of mistakes. Family life is competitive and opportunistic - anyone who behaves differently are treated harshly not only by parents but also by siblings. We can think of so many such families. The results are often the same, once the lid goes off the pressure-cooker, the kids rebel into all sorts of self-destructive behavior and the family crumbles into disarray, decline, and sometimes, in tragedy.
I believe the irony in the next 5 - 10 years may be this. There may come a day when Chinese public opinion becomes so unrealistic and unreasonable that CCP's controls becomes the last line of defense for the Chinese nation - and the rest of the world - from national and global tragedy.
Like someone who keeps a lion cub as a pet in the middle of a city, as the lion grows up the cage that used to keep the owner safe becomes something that struggles to protect the rest of the city (i.e. the world) from the lion - and, the lion (the Chinese people) from itself. Because the lion wants to leave the cage although the lion does not know that it is unable to handle and survive in the city and unable to survive in the wild. The CCP might find itself in the no-win position being the zoo-keeper struggling to keep the lion in the cage.
Society and the nation improves through self-examination and self-correction. Society must be open to new facts and new questions about the status quo no matter how uncomfortable or how disruptive they may be. The CCP needs to transition to a different social contract based on a more open and enlightened approach - even at the cost of its own demise - otherwise, to use a well-worn expression, it will eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. Any true Chinese patriot would wish China to avoid that fate.
It may be that China has reasons to fear that the Chinese people - the masses - will act (or overeact) irrationally to information and the opinions of others. May be they lack the faculties of critical thinking, rational thinking, wisdom, tolerance and self-belief to respond in the most positive manner. That is also one of my concerns as China becomes a global power of historic proportions. By consciously feeding the population one carefully calibrated set of world view; one that is conducive to the ideal reality of the CCP, the CCP simply ensure that the danger persists and that can only increase.
Where most observers would see this through a power political lens, I happen to also see this as a cultural condition. One only has to look at many Chinese families to see a similar pattern of pride mixed with bitterness, success mixed with insecurity, respect mixed with resentment, love mixed with deception. Picture a scenario we see all so often: a family with showy and ambitious parents on-the-make. The parents push the kids hard, demand obedience but never listen or understand who the children really are or respect what they want from their lives. The parents lavish material goods and boasts of only good things but never admits of mistakes. Family life is competitive and opportunistic - anyone who behaves differently are treated harshly not only by parents but also by siblings. We can think of so many such families. The results are often the same, once the lid goes off the pressure-cooker, the kids rebel into all sorts of self-destructive behavior and the family crumbles into disarray, decline, and sometimes, in tragedy.
I believe the irony in the next 5 - 10 years may be this. There may come a day when Chinese public opinion becomes so unrealistic and unreasonable that CCP's controls becomes the last line of defense for the Chinese nation - and the rest of the world - from national and global tragedy.
Like someone who keeps a lion cub as a pet in the middle of a city, as the lion grows up the cage that used to keep the owner safe becomes something that struggles to protect the rest of the city (i.e. the world) from the lion - and, the lion (the Chinese people) from itself. Because the lion wants to leave the cage although the lion does not know that it is unable to handle and survive in the city and unable to survive in the wild. The CCP might find itself in the no-win position being the zoo-keeper struggling to keep the lion in the cage.
Society and the nation improves through self-examination and self-correction. Society must be open to new facts and new questions about the status quo no matter how uncomfortable or how disruptive they may be. The CCP needs to transition to a different social contract based on a more open and enlightened approach - even at the cost of its own demise - otherwise, to use a well-worn expression, it will eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. Any true Chinese patriot would wish China to avoid that fate.
Friday, January 22, 2010
My Statement of Defence - LXB
我的自辯--劉曉波
《起訴書》（京一分檢刑訴[2009]247號）列舉了六篇文章和《零八憲章》，並總中引述了三百三十多字據此指控我觸犯了《刑法》第105條第2款之規定，犯有“煽動顛覆國家政權罪”，應當追究刑事責任。
對《起訴書》所列舉事實，除了說我“在徵集了三百餘人的簽名後”的事實陳述不準確之外，對其他的事實，我沒有異議。那六篇文章是我寫的，我參與了《零八憲章》，但我徵集的簽名只有70人左右，而不是三百多人，其他人的簽名不是我徵集的。至於據此指控我犯罪，我無法接受。在我失去自由的一年多時間裏，面對預審警官、檢察官和法官的詢問，我一直堅持自己無罪。現在，我將從中國憲法中的有關規定、聯合國的國際人權公約、我的政治改革主張、歷史潮流等多方面為自己進行無罪辯護。
一、改革開放帶來的重要成果之一，就是國人的人權意識的日益覺醒，民間維權的此起彼伏，推動中國政府在人權觀念上的進步。2004年全國人大修憲，把“國家尊重和保障人權”寫進了憲法，遂使人權保障成為依法治國的憲法原則。這些國家必須尊重和保障的人權，就是憲法第35條規定的諸項公民權利，言論自由便是基本人權之一。我的言論所表達的不同政見，是一個中國公民在行使憲法所賦予的言論自由權利，非但不能受到政府的限制和任意剝奪，反而必須得到國家的尊重和法律的保護。所以，起訴書對我的指控，侵犯了我作為中國公民的基本人權，違反了中國的根本大法，是典型的因言治罪，是古老的文字獄在當代中國的延續，理應受到道義的譴責和違憲追究。《刑法》第105條第二款也有違憲之嫌，應該提請全國人大對其進行合憲性審查。
二、《起訴書》根據所引的幾段話就指控我“以造謠、誹謗等方式煽動顛覆國家政權，推翻社會主義制度”這是欲加之罪。因為“造謠”是捏造、編造虛假資訊，中傷他人。“誹謗”是無中生有地詆毀他人的信譽與人格。二者涉及的都是事實的真假，涉及他人的名譽與利益。而我的言論皆為批評性的評論，是思想觀點的表達，是價值判斷而非事實判斷，也沒有對任何人造成傷害。所以，我的言論與造謠、誹謗風馬牛不相及。換言之，批評不是造謠，反對更不是誹謗。
三、《起訴書》根據《零八憲章》的幾段言論指控我誣衊執政黨，“試圖煽動顛覆現政權”。這指控有斷章取義之嫌，它完全無視《零八憲章》的整體表述，無視我所有的文章所表述的一貫觀點。
首先，《零八憲章》指出的“人權災難”都是發生在當代中國的事實，“反右”錯劃了五十多萬右派，“大躍進”造成了上千萬人的非自然死亡，“文革”造成國家的浩劫。“六‧四”是血案，許多人死了，許多人被投入監獄。這些事實都是舉世公認的“人權災難”，確實為中國的發展帶來危機，“束縛了中華民族的自身發展，制約了人類文明的進步。”至於取消一黨壟斷執政特權，不過是要求執政黨進行還政於民的改革，最終建立“民有、民治、民享”的自由國家。
其次，《零八憲章》所申明的價值和所提出的政改主張，其長遠目標是建成自由民主的聯邦共和國，其改革措施是十九條，其改革方式是漸進的和平的方式。這是有感於現行的跛足改革的種種弊端，要求執政黨變跛足為雙足，即政治與經濟同步並進的均衡改革。也就是從民間的角度推動官方儘快動還政於民的改革，用自下而上的民間壓力敦促政府進行自上而下的政治變革，從而形成官民互動的良性合作，以儘早實現國人的百年憲政之夢想。
再次，從1989年到2009年的二十年裏，我所表達的中國政治改革的觀點，一直是漸進、和平、有序、可控。我也一貫反對一步到位的激進改革，更反對暴力革命。這種漸進式改革主張，在我的《通過改變社會來改變政權》一文中有著明確的表述：通過致力於民間權利意識的覺醒、民間維權的擴張、民間自主性的上升、民間社會的發展，形成自下而上的壓力，以推動自上而下的官方改革。事實上，中國三十年的改革實踐證明，每一次具有制度創新性質的改革措施的出臺和實施，其最根本的動力皆來自民間的自發改革，民間改革的認同性和影響逐漸擴大，迫使官方接受民間的創新嘗試，從而變成自上而下的改革決策。
總之，漸進、和平、有序、可控，自下而上與自上而下的互動，是我關於中國政治改革的關鍵字。因為這種方式代價最小，效果最大。我知道政治變革的基本常識，有序、可控的社會變革必定優於無序、失控的變革。壞政府治下的秩序也優於無政府的天下大亂。所以，我反對獨裁化或壟斷化的執政方式，並不是“煽動顛覆現政權”。換言之，反對並不等於顛覆。
四、中國有“滿招損、謙受益”的古訓，西諺有“狂妄必遭天譴”的箴言。我知道自己的局限，所以，我也知道我的公開言論不可能十全十美或完全正確。特別是我的時評類文章，不嚴謹的論證，情緒化的宣泄，錯誤的表述，以偏蓋全的結論……在所難免。但是，這些有局限性的言論，與犯罪毫無關係，不能作為治罪的依據。因為，言論自由之權利，不僅包括發表正確觀點的權利，也包括發表錯誤言論的權利。正確的言論和多數的意見需要保護；不正確的言論和少數的意見，同樣需要權利的保護。正所謂：我可以不贊成或反對你的觀點，但我堅決捍衛你公開表達不同觀點的權利，哪怕你所表達的觀點是錯誤的，這，才是言論自由的精義。對此，中國古代傳統中也有過經典的概括。我把這種概括稱為二十四字箴言：知無不言，言無不盡；言者無罪，聞者足戒；有則改之，無則加勉。正因為這二十四字箴言道出了言論自由的要義，才能讓每一代國人耳熟能詳，流傳至今。我認為，其中“言者無罪，聞者足戒”，完全可以作為當代國人對待批評意見的座右銘，更應該成為當權者對待不同政見的警示。
五、我無罪，因為對我的指控有違國際社會公認的人權準則。早在1948年，中國作為聯合國的常任理事國就參與起草了《世界人權宣言》；五十年後的1998年，中國政府又向國際社會作出了簽署聯合國制定的兩大國際人權公約的莊嚴承諾。其中《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》把言論自由列為最基本的普世人權，要求各國政府必須加以尊重和保障。中國作為聯合國常任理事國，也作為聯合國人權理事會的成員，有義務遵守聯合國制定的人權公約，有責任餞行自己的承諾，也應該模範地執行聯合國發佈的人權保障條款。惟其如此，中國政府才能切實保障本國國民的人權，為推動國際人權事業做出自己的貢獻，從而顯示出一個大國的文明風範。
遺憾的是，中國政府並沒有完全履行自己的義務和兌現自己的承諾，並沒有把紙上的保證落實為現實的行動，有憲法而無憲政，有承諾而無兌現，仍然是中國政府在應對國際社會的批評時的常態。現在對我的指控就是最新的例證。顯然，這樣的因言治罪，與中國作為常任理事國和人權理事會的成員的身份相悖，有損於中國的政治形象和國家利益，無法在政治上取信于文明世界。
六、無論在中國還是在世界，無論是在古代還是現當代，因言治罪的文字獄都是反人道反人權的行為，有悖於大勢所趨、人心所向的時代潮流。回顧中國歷史，即使在家天下的帝制時代，從秦到清，文字獄的盛行，歷來都是一個政權的執政污點，也是中華民族的恥辱。秦始皇有統一中國之功，但其“焚書坑儒”之暴政卻遺臭萬年。漢武帝雄才大略，但其閹割太史公司馬遷之舉則倍受病詬。清朝有“康乾盛世”，但其頻繁的文字獄也只能留下名。相反，漢文帝在二千多年前就廢除過因言治罪的“誣謗罪”，由此贏得了開朝仁君的美名和歷代推崇的“文景之治”。
進入現代中國，中國共產黨之所以由弱而強，最終戰勝國民黨，在根本上源自其“反獨裁爭自由”的道義力量。1949年前，中共的《新華日報》和《解放日報》經常發文抨擊蔣家政權對言論自由的壓制，為因言獲罪的有識之士大聲疾呼。毛澤東等中共領袖也多次論及言論自由及基本人權。但1949年後，從反右到文革，林昭被槍斃，張志新被割喉，言論自由在毛時代消失了，國家陷於萬馬齊喑的死寂。改革以來，執政黨撥亂反正，對不同政見的容忍度有大幅度提高，社會的言論空間不斷擴大，文字獄大幅度減少，但因言治罪的傳統並沒有完全滅絕。從四‧五到六‧四，從民主牆到零八憲章，因言治罪的案例時有發生。我此次獲罪，不過是最近的文字獄而已。
二十一世紀的今天，言論自由早已成為多數國人的共識，文字獄卻是千夫所指。從客觀效果上看，防民之口甚於防川，監獄的高牆關不住自由的表達。一個政權不可能靠壓抑不同政見來建立合法性，也不可能靠文字獄來達成長治久安。因為，筆桿子的問題只能訴諸筆桿子來解決，一旦動用槍桿子解決筆桿子的問題，只能造成人權災難。只有從制度上根絕文字獄，憲法所規定的言論自由權利才能落實到每一位國民身上；只有當國民的言論自由權利得到制度化的現實保障，文字獄才會在中國大地上滅絕。
因言治罪，不符合中國憲法所確立的人權原則，違反了聯合國發佈的國際人權公約，有悖於普世道義與歷史潮流。我為自己所做的無罪辯護，希望能夠得到法庭的採納，從而讓此案的裁決在中國法治史上具有開先河的意義，經得起中國憲法之人權條款與國際人權公約的審查，也經得起道義的追問和歷史的檢驗。
謝謝大家！
劉曉波（2009年12月23日）
(自由亞洲電台)
《起訴書》（京一分檢刑訴[2009]247號）列舉了六篇文章和《零八憲章》，並總中引述了三百三十多字據此指控我觸犯了《刑法》第105條第2款之規定，犯有“煽動顛覆國家政權罪”，應當追究刑事責任。
對《起訴書》所列舉事實，除了說我“在徵集了三百餘人的簽名後”的事實陳述不準確之外，對其他的事實，我沒有異議。那六篇文章是我寫的，我參與了《零八憲章》，但我徵集的簽名只有70人左右，而不是三百多人，其他人的簽名不是我徵集的。至於據此指控我犯罪，我無法接受。在我失去自由的一年多時間裏，面對預審警官、檢察官和法官的詢問，我一直堅持自己無罪。現在，我將從中國憲法中的有關規定、聯合國的國際人權公約、我的政治改革主張、歷史潮流等多方面為自己進行無罪辯護。
一、改革開放帶來的重要成果之一，就是國人的人權意識的日益覺醒，民間維權的此起彼伏，推動中國政府在人權觀念上的進步。2004年全國人大修憲，把“國家尊重和保障人權”寫進了憲法，遂使人權保障成為依法治國的憲法原則。這些國家必須尊重和保障的人權，就是憲法第35條規定的諸項公民權利，言論自由便是基本人權之一。我的言論所表達的不同政見，是一個中國公民在行使憲法所賦予的言論自由權利，非但不能受到政府的限制和任意剝奪，反而必須得到國家的尊重和法律的保護。所以，起訴書對我的指控，侵犯了我作為中國公民的基本人權，違反了中國的根本大法，是典型的因言治罪，是古老的文字獄在當代中國的延續，理應受到道義的譴責和違憲追究。《刑法》第105條第二款也有違憲之嫌，應該提請全國人大對其進行合憲性審查。
二、《起訴書》根據所引的幾段話就指控我“以造謠、誹謗等方式煽動顛覆國家政權，推翻社會主義制度”這是欲加之罪。因為“造謠”是捏造、編造虛假資訊，中傷他人。“誹謗”是無中生有地詆毀他人的信譽與人格。二者涉及的都是事實的真假，涉及他人的名譽與利益。而我的言論皆為批評性的評論，是思想觀點的表達，是價值判斷而非事實判斷，也沒有對任何人造成傷害。所以，我的言論與造謠、誹謗風馬牛不相及。換言之，批評不是造謠，反對更不是誹謗。
三、《起訴書》根據《零八憲章》的幾段言論指控我誣衊執政黨，“試圖煽動顛覆現政權”。這指控有斷章取義之嫌，它完全無視《零八憲章》的整體表述，無視我所有的文章所表述的一貫觀點。
首先，《零八憲章》指出的“人權災難”都是發生在當代中國的事實，“反右”錯劃了五十多萬右派，“大躍進”造成了上千萬人的非自然死亡，“文革”造成國家的浩劫。“六‧四”是血案，許多人死了，許多人被投入監獄。這些事實都是舉世公認的“人權災難”，確實為中國的發展帶來危機，“束縛了中華民族的自身發展，制約了人類文明的進步。”至於取消一黨壟斷執政特權，不過是要求執政黨進行還政於民的改革，最終建立“民有、民治、民享”的自由國家。
其次，《零八憲章》所申明的價值和所提出的政改主張，其長遠目標是建成自由民主的聯邦共和國，其改革措施是十九條，其改革方式是漸進的和平的方式。這是有感於現行的跛足改革的種種弊端，要求執政黨變跛足為雙足，即政治與經濟同步並進的均衡改革。也就是從民間的角度推動官方儘快動還政於民的改革，用自下而上的民間壓力敦促政府進行自上而下的政治變革，從而形成官民互動的良性合作，以儘早實現國人的百年憲政之夢想。
再次，從1989年到2009年的二十年裏，我所表達的中國政治改革的觀點，一直是漸進、和平、有序、可控。我也一貫反對一步到位的激進改革，更反對暴力革命。這種漸進式改革主張，在我的《通過改變社會來改變政權》一文中有著明確的表述：通過致力於民間權利意識的覺醒、民間維權的擴張、民間自主性的上升、民間社會的發展，形成自下而上的壓力，以推動自上而下的官方改革。事實上，中國三十年的改革實踐證明，每一次具有制度創新性質的改革措施的出臺和實施，其最根本的動力皆來自民間的自發改革，民間改革的認同性和影響逐漸擴大，迫使官方接受民間的創新嘗試，從而變成自上而下的改革決策。
總之，漸進、和平、有序、可控，自下而上與自上而下的互動，是我關於中國政治改革的關鍵字。因為這種方式代價最小，效果最大。我知道政治變革的基本常識，有序、可控的社會變革必定優於無序、失控的變革。壞政府治下的秩序也優於無政府的天下大亂。所以，我反對獨裁化或壟斷化的執政方式，並不是“煽動顛覆現政權”。換言之，反對並不等於顛覆。
四、中國有“滿招損、謙受益”的古訓，西諺有“狂妄必遭天譴”的箴言。我知道自己的局限，所以，我也知道我的公開言論不可能十全十美或完全正確。特別是我的時評類文章，不嚴謹的論證，情緒化的宣泄，錯誤的表述，以偏蓋全的結論……在所難免。但是，這些有局限性的言論，與犯罪毫無關係，不能作為治罪的依據。因為，言論自由之權利，不僅包括發表正確觀點的權利，也包括發表錯誤言論的權利。正確的言論和多數的意見需要保護；不正確的言論和少數的意見，同樣需要權利的保護。正所謂：我可以不贊成或反對你的觀點，但我堅決捍衛你公開表達不同觀點的權利，哪怕你所表達的觀點是錯誤的，這，才是言論自由的精義。對此，中國古代傳統中也有過經典的概括。我把這種概括稱為二十四字箴言：知無不言，言無不盡；言者無罪，聞者足戒；有則改之，無則加勉。正因為這二十四字箴言道出了言論自由的要義，才能讓每一代國人耳熟能詳，流傳至今。我認為，其中“言者無罪，聞者足戒”，完全可以作為當代國人對待批評意見的座右銘，更應該成為當權者對待不同政見的警示。
五、我無罪，因為對我的指控有違國際社會公認的人權準則。早在1948年，中國作為聯合國的常任理事國就參與起草了《世界人權宣言》；五十年後的1998年，中國政府又向國際社會作出了簽署聯合國制定的兩大國際人權公約的莊嚴承諾。其中《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》把言論自由列為最基本的普世人權，要求各國政府必須加以尊重和保障。中國作為聯合國常任理事國，也作為聯合國人權理事會的成員，有義務遵守聯合國制定的人權公約，有責任餞行自己的承諾，也應該模範地執行聯合國發佈的人權保障條款。惟其如此，中國政府才能切實保障本國國民的人權，為推動國際人權事業做出自己的貢獻，從而顯示出一個大國的文明風範。
遺憾的是，中國政府並沒有完全履行自己的義務和兌現自己的承諾，並沒有把紙上的保證落實為現實的行動，有憲法而無憲政，有承諾而無兌現，仍然是中國政府在應對國際社會的批評時的常態。現在對我的指控就是最新的例證。顯然，這樣的因言治罪，與中國作為常任理事國和人權理事會的成員的身份相悖，有損於中國的政治形象和國家利益，無法在政治上取信于文明世界。
六、無論在中國還是在世界，無論是在古代還是現當代，因言治罪的文字獄都是反人道反人權的行為，有悖於大勢所趨、人心所向的時代潮流。回顧中國歷史，即使在家天下的帝制時代，從秦到清，文字獄的盛行，歷來都是一個政權的執政污點，也是中華民族的恥辱。秦始皇有統一中國之功，但其“焚書坑儒”之暴政卻遺臭萬年。漢武帝雄才大略，但其閹割太史公司馬遷之舉則倍受病詬。清朝有“康乾盛世”，但其頻繁的文字獄也只能留下名。相反，漢文帝在二千多年前就廢除過因言治罪的“誣謗罪”，由此贏得了開朝仁君的美名和歷代推崇的“文景之治”。
進入現代中國，中國共產黨之所以由弱而強，最終戰勝國民黨，在根本上源自其“反獨裁爭自由”的道義力量。1949年前，中共的《新華日報》和《解放日報》經常發文抨擊蔣家政權對言論自由的壓制，為因言獲罪的有識之士大聲疾呼。毛澤東等中共領袖也多次論及言論自由及基本人權。但1949年後，從反右到文革，林昭被槍斃，張志新被割喉，言論自由在毛時代消失了，國家陷於萬馬齊喑的死寂。改革以來，執政黨撥亂反正，對不同政見的容忍度有大幅度提高，社會的言論空間不斷擴大，文字獄大幅度減少，但因言治罪的傳統並沒有完全滅絕。從四‧五到六‧四，從民主牆到零八憲章，因言治罪的案例時有發生。我此次獲罪，不過是最近的文字獄而已。
二十一世紀的今天，言論自由早已成為多數國人的共識，文字獄卻是千夫所指。從客觀效果上看，防民之口甚於防川，監獄的高牆關不住自由的表達。一個政權不可能靠壓抑不同政見來建立合法性，也不可能靠文字獄來達成長治久安。因為，筆桿子的問題只能訴諸筆桿子來解決，一旦動用槍桿子解決筆桿子的問題，只能造成人權災難。只有從制度上根絕文字獄，憲法所規定的言論自由權利才能落實到每一位國民身上；只有當國民的言論自由權利得到制度化的現實保障，文字獄才會在中國大地上滅絕。
因言治罪，不符合中國憲法所確立的人權原則，違反了聯合國發佈的國際人權公約，有悖於普世道義與歷史潮流。我為自己所做的無罪辯護，希望能夠得到法庭的採納，從而讓此案的裁決在中國法治史上具有開先河的意義，經得起中國憲法之人權條款與國際人權公約的審查，也經得起道義的追問和歷史的檢驗。
謝謝大家！
劉曉波（2009年12月23日）
(自由亞洲電台)
I Have No Enemy - LXB
劉曉波的妻子劉霞透過自由亞洲電台網站，發表劉曉波題為「我沒有敵人——我的最後陳述」的文章。
以下為文章全文：
我沒有敵人——我的最後陳述 劉曉波（2009年12月23日）
在我已過半百的人生道路上，1989年6月是我生命的重大轉折時刻。那之前，我是文革後恢復高考的第一屆大學生（七七級），從學士到碩士再到博士，我的讀書生涯是一帆風順，畢業後留在北京師範大學任教。在講台上，我是一名頗受學生歡迎的教師。同時，我又是一名公共知識分子，在上世紀八十年代發表過引起轟動的文章與著作，經常受邀去各地演講，還應歐美國家之邀出國做訪問學者。我給自己提出的要求是：無論做人還是為文，都要活得誠實、負責、有尊嚴。那之後，因從美國回來參加八九運動，我被以「反革命宣傳煽動罪」投入監獄，也失去了我酷愛的講台，再也不能在國內發表文章和演講。僅僅因為發表不同政見和參加和平民主運動，一名教師就失去了講台，一個作家就失去了發表的權利，一位公共知識人就失去公開演講的機會，這，無論之於我個人還是之於改革開放已經三十年的中國，都是一種悲哀。
想起來，六‧四後我最富有戲劇性的經歷，居然都與法庭相關；我兩次面對公講話的機會都是北京市中級法院的開庭提供的，一次是1991年1月，一次是現在。雖然兩次被指控的罪名不同，但其實質基本相同，皆是因言獲罪。
二十年過去了，六‧四冤魂還未瞑目，被六‧四情結引向持不同政見者之路的我，在1991年走出秦城監獄之後，就失去了在自己的祖國公開發言的權利，而只能通過境外媒體發言，並因此而被長年監控，被監視居住（1995年5月-1996年1月），被勞動教養（1996年10月-1999年10月），現在又再次被政權的敵人意識推上了被告席，但我仍然要對這個剝奪我自由的政權說，我監守著二十年前我在《六‧二絕食宣言》中所表達的信念——我沒有敵人，也沒有仇恨。所有監控過我，捉捕過我、審訊過我的警察，起訴過我的檢察官，判決過我的法官，都不是我的敵人。雖然我無法接受你們的監控、逮捕、起訴和判決，但我尊重你的職業與人格，包括現在代表控方起訴我的張榮革和潘雪晴兩位檢察官。在12月3日兩位對我的詢問中，我能感到你們的尊重和誠意。
因為，仇恨會腐蝕一個人的智慧和良知，敵人意識將毒化一個民族的精神，煽動起你死我活的殘酷鬥爭，毀掉一個社會的寬容和人性，阻礙一個國家走向自由民主的進程。所以，我希望自己能夠超越個人的遭遇來看待國家的發展和社會的變化，以最大的善意對待政權的敵意，以愛化解恨。
眾所周知，是改革開放帶來了國家的發展和社會的變化。在我看來，改革開放始於放棄毛時代的「以階級鬥爭為綱」的執政方針。轉而致力於經濟發展和社會和諧。放棄「鬥爭哲學」的過程也是逐步淡化敵人意識、消除仇恨心理的過程，是一個擠掉浸入人性之中的「狼奶」的過程。正是這一進程，為改革開放提供了一個寬鬆的國內外環境，為恢復人與人之間的互愛，為不同利益不同價值的和平共處提供了柔軟的人性土壤，從而為國人的創造力之併發和愛心之恢復提供了符合人性的激勵。可以說，對外放棄「反帝反修」，對內放棄「階級鬥爭」，是中國的改革開放得以持續至今的基本前提。經濟走向市場，文化趨於多元，秩序逐漸法治，皆受益於「敵人意識」的淡化。即使在進步最為緩慢的政治領域，敵人意識的淡化也讓政權對社會的多元化有了日益擴大的包容性，對不同政見者的迫害之力度也大幅度下降，對八九運動的定性也由「動暴亂」改為「政治風波」。敵人意識的淡化讓政權逐步接受了人權的普世性，1998年，中國政府向世界做出簽署聯合國的兩大國際人權公約的承諾，標誌著中國對普世人權標準的承認；2004年，全國人大修憲首次把「國家尊重和保障人權」寫進了憲法，標誌著人權已經成為中國法治的根本原則之一。與此同時，現政權又提出「以人為本」、「創建和諧社會」，標誌著中共執政理念的進步。
這些宏觀方面的進步，也能從我被捕以來的親身經歷中感受到。
儘管我堅持認為自己無罪，對我的指控是違憲的，但在我失去自由的一年多時間裏，先後經歷了兩個關押地點、四位預審警官、三位檢察官、二位法官，他們的辦案，沒有不尊重，沒有超時，沒有逼供。他們的態度平和、理性，且時時流露出善意。6月23日，我被從監視居住處轉到北京市公安局第一看守所，簡稱「北看」。在北看的半年時間裏，我看到了監管上的進步。
1996年，我曾在老北看（半步橋）呆過，與十幾年前半步橋時的北看相比，現在的北看，在硬體設施和軟體管理上都有了極大的改善。特別是北看首創的人性化管理，在尊重在押人員的權利和人格的基礎上，將柔性化的管理落實到管教們的一言一行中，體現在「溫馨廣播」、「悔悟」雜誌、飯前音樂、起睡覺的音樂中，這種管理，讓在押人員感到了尊嚴與溫暖，激發了他們維持監室秩序和反對牢頭獄霸的自覺性，不但為在押人員提供了人性化的生活環境，也極大地改善了在押人員的訴訟環境和心態，我與主管我所在監室的劉崢管教有著近距離的接觸，他對在押人員的尊重和關心，體現在管理的每個細節中，滲透到他的一言一行中，讓人感到溫暖。結識這位真誠、正直、負責、善心的劉管教，也可以算作我在北看的幸運吧。
政治基於這樣的信念和親歷，我堅信中國的政治進步不會停止，我對未來自由中國的降臨充滿樂觀的期待，因為任何力量也無法阻攔心向自由的人性欲求，中國終將變成人權至上的法治國。我也期待這樣的進步能體現在此案的審理中，期待合議庭的公正裁決——經得起歷史檢驗的裁決。
如果讓我說出這二十年來最幸運的經歷，那就是得到了我的妻子劉霞的無私的愛。今天，我妻子無法到庭旁聽，但我還是要對你說，親愛的，我堅信你對我的愛將一如既往。這多年來，在我的無自由的生活中，我們的愛飽含著外在環境所強加的苦澀，但回味起來依然無窮。我在有形的監獄中服刑，你在無形的心獄中等待，你的愛，就是超越高牆、穿透鐵窗的陽光，撫摸我的每寸皮膚，溫暖我的每個細胞，讓我始終保有內心的平和、坦蕩與明亮，讓獄中的每分鐘都充滿意義。而我對你的愛，充滿了負疚和歉意，有時沉重得讓我腳步蹣跚。我是荒野中的頑石，任由狂風暴雨的抽打，冷得讓人不敢觸碰。但我的愛是堅硬的、鋒利的，可以穿透任何阻礙。即使我被碾成粉末，我也會用灰燼擁抱你。
親愛的，有你的愛，我就會坦然面對即將到來的審判，無悔於自己的選擇，樂觀地期待著明天。我期待我的國家是一片可以自由表達的土地，在這裏，每一位國民的發言都會得到同等的善待；在這裏，不同的價值、思想、信仰、政見……既相互競爭又和平共處；在這裏，多數的意見和少數的儀意見都會得到平等的保障，特別是那些不同於當權者的政見將得到充分的尊重和保護；在這裏，所有的政見都將攤在陽光下接受民的選擇，每個國民都能毫無恐懼地發表政見，決不會因發表不同政見而遭受政治迫害；我期待，我將是中國綿綿不絕的文字獄的最後一個受害者，從此之後不再有人因言獲罪。
表達自由，人權之基，人性之本，真理之母。封殺言論自由，踐踏人權，窒息人性，壓抑真理。
為餞行憲法賦予的言論自由之權利，當盡到一個中國公民的社會責任，我的所作所為無罪，即便為此被指控，也無怨言。
謝謝各位！
劉曉波（2009年12月23日）
以下為文章全文：
我沒有敵人——我的最後陳述 劉曉波（2009年12月23日）
在我已過半百的人生道路上，1989年6月是我生命的重大轉折時刻。那之前，我是文革後恢復高考的第一屆大學生（七七級），從學士到碩士再到博士，我的讀書生涯是一帆風順，畢業後留在北京師範大學任教。在講台上，我是一名頗受學生歡迎的教師。同時，我又是一名公共知識分子，在上世紀八十年代發表過引起轟動的文章與著作，經常受邀去各地演講，還應歐美國家之邀出國做訪問學者。我給自己提出的要求是：無論做人還是為文，都要活得誠實、負責、有尊嚴。那之後，因從美國回來參加八九運動，我被以「反革命宣傳煽動罪」投入監獄，也失去了我酷愛的講台，再也不能在國內發表文章和演講。僅僅因為發表不同政見和參加和平民主運動，一名教師就失去了講台，一個作家就失去了發表的權利，一位公共知識人就失去公開演講的機會，這，無論之於我個人還是之於改革開放已經三十年的中國，都是一種悲哀。
想起來，六‧四後我最富有戲劇性的經歷，居然都與法庭相關；我兩次面對公講話的機會都是北京市中級法院的開庭提供的，一次是1991年1月，一次是現在。雖然兩次被指控的罪名不同，但其實質基本相同，皆是因言獲罪。
二十年過去了，六‧四冤魂還未瞑目，被六‧四情結引向持不同政見者之路的我，在1991年走出秦城監獄之後，就失去了在自己的祖國公開發言的權利，而只能通過境外媒體發言，並因此而被長年監控，被監視居住（1995年5月-1996年1月），被勞動教養（1996年10月-1999年10月），現在又再次被政權的敵人意識推上了被告席，但我仍然要對這個剝奪我自由的政權說，我監守著二十年前我在《六‧二絕食宣言》中所表達的信念——我沒有敵人，也沒有仇恨。所有監控過我，捉捕過我、審訊過我的警察，起訴過我的檢察官，判決過我的法官，都不是我的敵人。雖然我無法接受你們的監控、逮捕、起訴和判決，但我尊重你的職業與人格，包括現在代表控方起訴我的張榮革和潘雪晴兩位檢察官。在12月3日兩位對我的詢問中，我能感到你們的尊重和誠意。
因為，仇恨會腐蝕一個人的智慧和良知，敵人意識將毒化一個民族的精神，煽動起你死我活的殘酷鬥爭，毀掉一個社會的寬容和人性，阻礙一個國家走向自由民主的進程。所以，我希望自己能夠超越個人的遭遇來看待國家的發展和社會的變化，以最大的善意對待政權的敵意，以愛化解恨。
眾所周知，是改革開放帶來了國家的發展和社會的變化。在我看來，改革開放始於放棄毛時代的「以階級鬥爭為綱」的執政方針。轉而致力於經濟發展和社會和諧。放棄「鬥爭哲學」的過程也是逐步淡化敵人意識、消除仇恨心理的過程，是一個擠掉浸入人性之中的「狼奶」的過程。正是這一進程，為改革開放提供了一個寬鬆的國內外環境，為恢復人與人之間的互愛，為不同利益不同價值的和平共處提供了柔軟的人性土壤，從而為國人的創造力之併發和愛心之恢復提供了符合人性的激勵。可以說，對外放棄「反帝反修」，對內放棄「階級鬥爭」，是中國的改革開放得以持續至今的基本前提。經濟走向市場，文化趨於多元，秩序逐漸法治，皆受益於「敵人意識」的淡化。即使在進步最為緩慢的政治領域，敵人意識的淡化也讓政權對社會的多元化有了日益擴大的包容性，對不同政見者的迫害之力度也大幅度下降，對八九運動的定性也由「動暴亂」改為「政治風波」。敵人意識的淡化讓政權逐步接受了人權的普世性，1998年，中國政府向世界做出簽署聯合國的兩大國際人權公約的承諾，標誌著中國對普世人權標準的承認；2004年，全國人大修憲首次把「國家尊重和保障人權」寫進了憲法，標誌著人權已經成為中國法治的根本原則之一。與此同時，現政權又提出「以人為本」、「創建和諧社會」，標誌著中共執政理念的進步。
這些宏觀方面的進步，也能從我被捕以來的親身經歷中感受到。
儘管我堅持認為自己無罪，對我的指控是違憲的，但在我失去自由的一年多時間裏，先後經歷了兩個關押地點、四位預審警官、三位檢察官、二位法官，他們的辦案，沒有不尊重，沒有超時，沒有逼供。他們的態度平和、理性，且時時流露出善意。6月23日，我被從監視居住處轉到北京市公安局第一看守所，簡稱「北看」。在北看的半年時間裏，我看到了監管上的進步。
1996年，我曾在老北看（半步橋）呆過，與十幾年前半步橋時的北看相比，現在的北看，在硬體設施和軟體管理上都有了極大的改善。特別是北看首創的人性化管理，在尊重在押人員的權利和人格的基礎上，將柔性化的管理落實到管教們的一言一行中，體現在「溫馨廣播」、「悔悟」雜誌、飯前音樂、起睡覺的音樂中，這種管理，讓在押人員感到了尊嚴與溫暖，激發了他們維持監室秩序和反對牢頭獄霸的自覺性，不但為在押人員提供了人性化的生活環境，也極大地改善了在押人員的訴訟環境和心態，我與主管我所在監室的劉崢管教有著近距離的接觸，他對在押人員的尊重和關心，體現在管理的每個細節中，滲透到他的一言一行中，讓人感到溫暖。結識這位真誠、正直、負責、善心的劉管教，也可以算作我在北看的幸運吧。
政治基於這樣的信念和親歷，我堅信中國的政治進步不會停止，我對未來自由中國的降臨充滿樂觀的期待，因為任何力量也無法阻攔心向自由的人性欲求，中國終將變成人權至上的法治國。我也期待這樣的進步能體現在此案的審理中，期待合議庭的公正裁決——經得起歷史檢驗的裁決。
如果讓我說出這二十年來最幸運的經歷，那就是得到了我的妻子劉霞的無私的愛。今天，我妻子無法到庭旁聽，但我還是要對你說，親愛的，我堅信你對我的愛將一如既往。這多年來，在我的無自由的生活中，我們的愛飽含著外在環境所強加的苦澀，但回味起來依然無窮。我在有形的監獄中服刑，你在無形的心獄中等待，你的愛，就是超越高牆、穿透鐵窗的陽光，撫摸我的每寸皮膚，溫暖我的每個細胞，讓我始終保有內心的平和、坦蕩與明亮，讓獄中的每分鐘都充滿意義。而我對你的愛，充滿了負疚和歉意，有時沉重得讓我腳步蹣跚。我是荒野中的頑石，任由狂風暴雨的抽打，冷得讓人不敢觸碰。但我的愛是堅硬的、鋒利的，可以穿透任何阻礙。即使我被碾成粉末，我也會用灰燼擁抱你。
親愛的，有你的愛，我就會坦然面對即將到來的審判，無悔於自己的選擇，樂觀地期待著明天。我期待我的國家是一片可以自由表達的土地，在這裏，每一位國民的發言都會得到同等的善待；在這裏，不同的價值、思想、信仰、政見……既相互競爭又和平共處；在這裏，多數的意見和少數的儀意見都會得到平等的保障，特別是那些不同於當權者的政見將得到充分的尊重和保護；在這裏，所有的政見都將攤在陽光下接受民的選擇，每個國民都能毫無恐懼地發表政見，決不會因發表不同政見而遭受政治迫害；我期待，我將是中國綿綿不絕的文字獄的最後一個受害者，從此之後不再有人因言獲罪。
表達自由，人權之基，人性之本，真理之母。封殺言論自由，踐踏人權，窒息人性，壓抑真理。
為餞行憲法賦予的言論自由之權利，當盡到一個中國公民的社會責任，我的所作所為無罪，即便為此被指控，也無怨言。
謝謝各位！
劉曉波（2009年12月23日）
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