Since the end of the last imperial Qing Dynasty in 1911, its successors, ROC and PRC have had no less than 14 draft and promulgated Constitution.
ROC
1. The Provisional Constitution of March 12, 1912
2. Yuan Shikai's Provisional Constitution of May 1, 1914
3. The Draft Consitution of the Anfu Parliament of August 12 ,1919
4. The Cao Kun Constitution of October 10, 1923
5. The Draft Constitution of Duan Qirui's regime of December 12, 1926
6. The Provisional Constitution for the Political Tutelage Period of 1931 of KMT
7. The Draft Constitution by the Legislative Yuan on March 1, 1934
8. The revised draft by the KMT's Central Executive Committee on May 5, 1936
9. The ROC's Constitution of December 25, 1946
PRC
10. The 1949 Common Program
11. The 1954 PRC's Constitution
12. The 1975 PRC's Constitution
13. The 1978 PRC's Constitution
14. The 1982 PRC's Constituion with major revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004
The only occassion of a Chinese Constitutional Convention happened in 1949 when the CCP convened the first China Peoples' Political Consultative Conference that approved the 1949 Common Program, the de facto PRC's Constitution betwen 1949-1954.
The first CPPCC was very much dominated by the CCP and its purported legitimacy was conferred by delegates from various parties friendly to the CCP. There was no equivalent of American Federalist Papers published or adequate discussion to draft an enduring constitutional charter. No wonder, the first one lasted a mere 5 years.
Obviously China is not lack of Constitution, what she lacks of is the Constitutionalism and its enforcement.
The central question is whether another constitutional convention is able to address all the issues so central to the constitional governance of the present day China besieged with wide ranging issues from electoral legitimacy to the party-state polity, from separatism to autonomy, from conceptual freedom to freedom in practice.
If one were to look at the section on the fundamental rights and duties of citizen in the 1982 Constitution, it may well be enshrined in that of a liberal democracy.
The problem is the acute absence of a sound constitutional framework and mechanism in promoting and safeguarding it. This requires a new understanding of separation of powers and check and balance.
Separatism is based on the notion of the right of self determination. This is not a difficult concept to understand, the right of self determination is akin to the right of an individual's right to marry and this right doesn't belong to the family.
From this perspective, it is not difficult to fault the Chinese's claim of soverignty over a sub political constituent like Tibet or a political constituent that have existed outside the polity for almost 60 years.
First, the autonomy given to the ethinic minority region especially that of Tibet remains contentious and becomes frequently an international issue that discredit Chinese diplomacy in the western media and public. Second, the regional polity of Taiwan maybe regarded as "one state two governments" in the legal sense.
The present constitution in its unitary form is inadequate in addressing these issues. Further, the course of action pursued by the CCP is economic agenda with Taiwan and political dialougue with Dalai Lama's government in exile are very measured and gradual steps.
It is also in this sense that the Constitutional Convention can be bold and inclusive for a peaceful constitutional settlement. However, this can only take place with CCP making political accommodation of some sort for the ideal of One China and also its concern of legitimacy.
Using the metaphor of hosting a party, the party can only be fun if everyone at the party can have fun.
It has also been discussed elsewhere that the future of a democratic China depends very much on whether CCP accepts or accedes to political pluralism. The former is preferred as the latter may be a result of chaos and disorder.
Across the Taiwan Straits, KMT has demonstrated its willingness to adapt to the political pluralism and its ability to regain the power by ballot.
Both parties are Leninist in origin and suffice to say that the CCP is more organized and determined and therefore more successful to perpetuate the one party-state polity.
Will the CCP has a change of heart like the KMT?
No evidence is present to show that the CCP is happy to accede to a power sharing arrangement execpt for the accommodation of one country two systems in Hong Kong and Macao where its allies are in control. The CCP leadership has of late spoken to intra-party democracy. This rules out the possibility of political pluralism in near future.
This is compounded by the fact that as long as the CCP continues to cling to the adage that the political power is derived from the gun barrel, any peaceful change to the Chinese party-state polity is likely depends on the development of intra-party democracy within the CCP.
A critical pre-condition to a multi-party democracy in China will requires the CCP to cede its monopoly over the military and that the military has to be independent and answerable to the state and not the party.
The concession on military control and accommodation on political pluralism that the CCP are asked to make is very substantial but need not be disadvantageous to the party.
The CCP has had almost 60 years of ruling experience and a nation-wide party machinery, this constitute an incumbency advantage that allows itself time to rule for many years to come and to earn legitimacy via free and open electoral contest and relevancy via dynamic political policies for sustainable and comprehensive development. Outside the border, it helps earning China, Chinese and the CCP the international respect.